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PER CURIAM 
 
     Before us are a motion for a certificate of appealability and for a 
stay of execution 
filed by petitioner/appellant,  Maxine Davidson White, as "next friend" 
for Gary Heidnik.  
On July 3, 1999, the District Court issued an order that denied the 
petitioner/appellant's 
application for a stay of execution and a certificate of appealability and 
dismissed her 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  The District Court's ruling was 
predicated on its 
conclusion that the petitioner/appellant lacked standing to bring an 
action as "next friend" 
to Gary Heidnik because she has not shown that he is "unable to litigate 
his own cause 
due to mental incapacity."  Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 165 
(1990).  The 
District Court issued a comprehensive opinion explaining in detail its 
analysis of the 
numerous arguments presented to it.  
     Because Heidnik is scheduled to be executed on the evening of 
Tuesday, July 6, 
we required the petitioner/appellant to file her brief on Sunday, July 4, 
and we directed 
the Commonwealth to file its response on Monday, July 5.  The 
petitioner/appellant filed 
a Reply on July 5, and the Commonwealth submitted a Supplemental Response.  
We 
heard oral argument on the morning of July 6.  We have considered all the 
arguments 
raised before us, as well as relevant portions of the record, and we 
conclude that the 
motion for a certificate of appealability and a stay of execution should 
be denied. 
     We are largely in agreement with the opinion of the District Court, 
but we add the 
following comments concerning the petitioner/appellant's argument that the  
"next 
friend" issue is controlled by Heidnik v. Horn, 112 F.3d 105 (3d Cir. 
1997).  This 
decision, among other things, directed the District Court to issue a stay 
of execution, but 
the  Supreme Court of the United States vacated that stay.  Horn v. White, 
520 U.S. 1183 
(1997).  The petitioner/appellant contends that, despite this order and 
despite the 
subsequent proceedings in state court, which resulted in a competency 
hearing and state 
court findings on the competency question, the prior panel decision 
requires us, by virtue 
of the law-of-the-case doctrine, to hold that she is entitled to "next 
friend" status.  We 
reject this argument.   
     Although we obviously cannot be certain of the basis for the Supreme 
Court's 
order, it seems most likely that it was based on the conclusion that the 
prior panel's 
handling  of the "next friend" question was incorrect.  But we need not 
resolve this 
question.  Even if the Supreme Court's order was not based on the 
conclusion that the 
petitioner/appellant lacked standing, we still do not believe that the 
prior panel decision 
would control our consideration of the "next friend" issue at this 
juncture.  The prior 
panel decision was based on a review of the record and findings of the 
federal district 
court.  Now, however, the Pennsylvania courts have conducted a new 
competency 
hearing and rendered new findings, and the issue comes before us now on a 
different 
record and in a different procedural posture.  The law-of-the-case 
doctrine did not prevent 
the Pennsylvania courts from taking these actions and did not compel the 
Pennsylvania 
courts to follow the prior panel decision.  Under 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2), 
the finding of the 
Court of Common Pleas regarding Heidnik's competency is presumptively 
correct and 
must be accepted unless the petitioner/appellant can overcome them by 
clear and 
convincing evidence.  Under 28 U.S.C.  2254 (d)(2), a federal writ may 
not be issued 
unless the state court made "an unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding."  This is a different 
standard of review 
than the standard applied by the prior panel when it ruled in 1997, and 
for this reason the 
prior panel's decision does not bind us here.  
     We agree with the District Court that the state court factual 
findings regarding 
Heidnik's competency are adequately supported by the record, and we reject 
the 
petitioner/appellant's contention that they are not entitled to deference 
due to alleged 
procedural defects.  We will therefore deny the application for a 
certificate of 
appealability and a stay of execution. 
 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
     Please file the foregoing opinion.  
No. 99-9004, MAXINE DAVIDSON WHITE, as next fried to GARY HEIDNIK, v. 
MARTIN HORN, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; 
GREGORY WHITE, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution of 
Pittsburgh; and the 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
McKee, Circuit Judge dissenting 
 
     Mr. Heidnik is clearly deserving of whatever sanction society 
reserves for its most 
heinous offenders.  That, of course, is not the issue before us. That 
issue was presented to the 
jury that heard the nightmarish evidence and decided to impose a sentence 
of death after finding 
that Heidnik was guilty of the atrocities he had been charged with. 
     Rather, the sole issue before us is whether his daughter has standing 
under Whitmore v. 
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990).  In order to resolve that question we must 
decide "whether [she] 
has provided an adequate explanation why [Mr. Heidnik] cannot appear on 
[his] own behalf to 
prosecute the action."  Heidnik v. Horn, 112 F.3d 105, 108 (3rd Cir. 1997 
(per curiam) That 
inquiry, in turn, depends upon whether she has established that he is 
mentally incapable of 
deciding for himself to forego whatever claims he would otherwise be able 
to assert on appeal.  
     Much of the controversy before us now is focused on whether our 
earlier decision still 
binds us under the law of the case doctrine even though our stay was 
subsequently vacated by the 
United States Supreme Court.  I doubt very much that we are still bound, 
but the hectic and 
hurried manner in which we have had to decide this incredibly intricate 
inquiry into Supreme 
Court procedure has not afforded me, at least, sufficient opportunity to 
resolve that question with 
enough certainty to allow it to govern my analysis now.  However, even the 
Commonwealth 
concedes that the prior action of the United States Supreme Court does not 
invalidate our prior 
analysis of the record that was before us in 1997.   I find that analysis 
compelling, and 
persuasive. Heidnik is the same now as he was then. At the hearing before 
the District Court, the 
Commonwealth agreed that Heidnik's mental condition on June 30, 1999 was 
the same that it 
was in 1997 when we decided In re Heidnik and found that Heidnik was 
Whitmore incompetent.  
The following exchange occurred:  
                    THE COURT: Has there been any change factually?  Has 
there 
          been any   the plaintiff Petitioner says there's no real change 
in 
          Heidnik's condition? 
 
                    [DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, I don't think that 
there 
          has been a change in Mr. Heidnik's condition according to their 
          experts and according to our experts . . . . 
 
                    THE COURT: So basically what I have even though we 
have had 
          this new hearing with different witnesses, there is no real 
change in 
          his condition. 
 N. T. 6/30/99 at 84 (Dist. Ct. Proceeding).  In 1997, we reviewed a nearly 
identical record to 
determine  Heidnik's competency to waive his appellate rights, and we 
rejected the 
District Court's finding that Heidnik's thought process was sufficiently 
moored to reality 
to allow him to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently execute such a 
waiver.  We 
stated:  
                    In the final analysis the record reflects a situation 
in which a 
          paranoid schizophrenic suffering from broad-based delusional 
          perceptions has made a decision to die immediately rather 
          than pursue available judicial remedies that conceivably 
          might spare his life.  The only explanation he has advanced 
          for having chosen immediate death is that after his death the 
          public will become convinced that he was an innocent victim 
          of a conspiracy and that the realization that he has been 
          executed though innocent will end capital punishment once 
          and for all.  Petitioners' three experts unanimously concluded 
          that Heidnik's death decision is based on his delusional 
          perception of reality--and has no rational basis.  Dr. O'Brien 
          [the Commonwealth's witness] has simply failed to explain 
          how Heidnik's choice has a rational basis and is not based on 
          his delusional perception. 
 
                    In short, the record does not support a rational 
explanation as 
          to  why, even if Heidnik has rationalized to himself that he 
          was innocent, he could, despite his delusions, make a rational 
          decision to die.  A psychiatric expert might have supplied this, 
          but O'Brien did not.  In the absence of any effective counter, 
          the petitioner has met her Whitmore burden, and the order of 
          the district court must be vacated.     
 
In re Heidnik, 112 F.3d at 112.   Accordingly, we ordered that the 
District Court to stay 
the then imminent execution and designate Maxine Davidson Heidnik's next 
friend, and 
appoint counsel for her.  
     Our decision was, of course, rendered without the benefit of the 
testimony of  Dr. 
Sadoff.  His testimony supports the Commonwealth's argument that Heidnik's 
choice is 
rooted in his attempt to derive some social meaning from his death, and 
therefore a 
rational decision.  That position was asserted by Dr. O'Brien before, and 
we rejected it.  
This does not, of course, mean that the subsequent corroboration of Dr. 
O'Brien's 
testimony can be ignored.  However, the corroboration offered by Dr. 
Sadoff still fails to 
answer the fundamental inquiry we posed in 1997.  It still "simply failed 
to explain how 
Heidnik's choice has a rational basis and is not based on his delusional 
perception." 
White, 112 F.3d at 112.   Without an answer to that question, I do not 
think that Heidnik 
can reasonably be found to be sufficiently competent to decide to forego 
his appellate 
rights. 
     The second thing that has changed since our decision in 1997 is the 
standard of our 
review.  In 1997 we were reviewing the District Court's findings based 
upon testimony  
elicited when it held a Whitmore hearing.  Now, of course we, must review 
the finding of 
the state court.  That review is governed the provisions of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C.  2254(d) ("AEDPA").  However, I 
believe that  
based on the record as it now stands, as well as when we originally made 
the statement set 
forth above, Ms. White has cleared even the heightened bar of AEDPA, and 
should be 
granted next friend status.   Given the volume of material referring to 
Heidnik's persisting 
delusional state,  Ms. White has shown that the Court of Common Pleas' 
finding that 
Heidnik is sufficiently rational to knowingly and intelligently waive his 
appellate rights is 
"an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 
presented in the State 
court proceeding."  Although the standard is now different, see Matteo v. 
Superintendent, 
171 F.3d 877 (1999) (en banc), the conclusion is the same.  Heidnik is "a 
paranoid 
schizophrenic suffering from broad-based delusional perceptions [who] has 
made a 
decision to die immediately rather than pursue available judicial remedies 
that 
conceivably might spare his life." His "decision" is inextricably 
intertwined with a belief 
structure that the Commonwealth concedes is genuine and not fabricated.  
That delusional 
belief structure is inextricably connected to his decision to forego an 
appeal.   Moreover,  
the record establishes that the contrary finding of the Court of Common 
Pleas is simply 
not a reasonable assessment of the evidence that was presented there. As 
the district court 
correctly notes, under 28 U.S.C.  3354(e)(1) 
                    This presumption of correctness can be overcome only 
by 
          clear and convincing evidence.  The evidence must 
          demonstrate either that the decision "was contrary to, or 
          involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
          federal law," or that it "was based on an unreasonable 
          determination of the facts."  28 U.S..  2254(d)(1)-(2).  The 
          state court determination of a defendant's competency is 
          entitled to the statutory presumption of correctness.  See 
          Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 736 (1990); Miller v. 
          Fenton, 4874 U.S. 104, 113. 
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 24.   In my opinion, Ms. White has overcome the 
presumption of 
correctness by clear and convincing evidence.  Accordingly, the District 
Court incorrectly 
allowed the state court's findings to determine the outcome in the 
District Court.  
     It may of course be that all of the claims that are waiting in the 
wings until the 
Whitemore issue is decided would one day be presented to a court in a 
proper context, 
and denied.  If that were to happen, Heidnik's execution would follow.  
But it would then 
be accomplished without the cloud of competency that now hangs over his 
pending 
execution.  
     Few, if any outside his family will mourn Heidnik's execution.  His 
crimes are 
etched into the collective memories of everyone who is a member of this 
community, and 
his lunacy made everyone feel less human to think that anyone could do 
what he did to 
another human being. Nevertheless, as I said at the outset, the legal 
inquiry we are forced 
to undertake does not, at this stage of the proceedings, allow his horrors 
to define our 
analysis.   
     It may well be that today we are writing the final chapter of the 
terror that was 
Heidnik.  However, I share the thoughts so poignantly echoed by  the Chief 
Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania when he recently wrote in a concurring 
opinion involving 
an issue other than the one now before us:  
          although I believe the record, state and federal, demonstrates 
          that Gary Heidnik, . . . is presently suffering from mental 
          illness in the form of paranoid schizophrenia . . ., and in my 
          view, is insane,  I cannot stand by and say nothing while an 
          insane person is put to death by the state contrary to the mores 
          of civilized society.   
           
Heidnik v. White, 554 Pa. 177, 191(1998) (Flahery, C.J. Concurring) 
(internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
     Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the decision of my 
colleagues. 
 
